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Protecting products versus platforms
Jacob S Sherkow
Choosing an IP protection regime depends on the type of company you are building.
Patents have long been the most impor-tant legal assets of biotech companies. 
Increasingly, however, biotech firms find 
themselves on one side of a divide: as either 
traditional product companies or platform 
companies. Given the differences between 
these two types of business models, the merits 
of intellectual property (IP) protection vary 
between them. This article explores how those 
differences relate to biotech startups and entre-
preneurs seeking to protect their inventions.
Patents and trade secrets
Biotech companies have traditionally sought to 
secure their intellectual assets using one of two 
forms of IP: patents or trade secrets. Patents are 
a time-limited, government-granted property 
right. They prohibit others from making, using 
or selling the invention claimed in the patent 
during its term—currently in the United States, 
20 years from the date it is filed with the US 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
For several reasons, it is important to decide 
early on in the development process whether to 
protect a piece of innovation with patents or as 
trade secrets. For patents, companies can stake 
an early claim to new and useful technologies 
by filing provisional patent applications—
often, simply, a rough, written description of 
the invention. Should priority disputes arise 
between competing inventions, a provisional 
application has the added advantage of proving 
that an inventor was the first to file a patent on 
the described technology.
After filing a provisional patent application, 
an inventor has one year to file a full, or com-
plete, patent application. That application must 
claim, in specific terms, the invention sought 
to be patented. The claims then undergo 
examination at the PTO. The Office ensures 
that the claimed invention is new, useful and 
“nonobvious.” In addition, the application itself 
must enable others to make and use the inven-
tion and must wholly disclose, to the public, the 
invention sought to be patented.
Inventors who believe competitors have 
reproduced or used their invention can enforce 
their patents through the courts by suing for 
patent infringement. Although filing patents 
with the PTO is typically inexpensive—at 
median, roughly $10,000, in addition to a few 
thousand in maintenance fees—enforcing 
them often costs millions. A patent infringe-
ment lawsuit concerning a product that gener-
ates at least $25 million per year in revenue—a 
level easily obtained by successful biotech 
products—will cost almost $7 million in 
attorneys’ fees1. At the same time, litigation 
often risks the validity of the patent sought to 
be enforced. If a court finds, despite the PTO’s 
examination, either that the application failed 
to properly disclose the invention or that the 
patent is not new, lacking in utility or obvious, 
the patent must be invalidated—an occurrence 
that happens in 43% of litigated cases2. Patents, 
therefore, are costly, high-risk/high-reward 
intellectual assets for biotech companies.
In contrast, trade secrets are cheap, low-
risk/low-reward forms of protection (Table 1). 
Trade secrets do not require any form of assess-
ment before a government agency. Rather, 
they are simply any information that “derives 
independent economic value” as a secret and 
is subject to reasonable efforts to keep it so3. 
These reasonable efforts may include requir-
ing users or employees to sign confidentiality 
agreements to keep the invention secret. Or 
it may simply include a company’s refusal to 
disclose the particulars of the invention to the 
public. Owners of trade secrets may enforce 
them against competitors when it appears that 
their rivals have learned about them through 
“improper means”—theft, bribery, misrepre-
sentation, and so on.
Consequently, and unlike patents, trade 
secrets remain indefinitely enforceable until 
they are disclosed. This is famously illustrated 
by Coca-Cola’s enduring 130-year-old—and 
counting—secret formula4, and perhaps less 
famously illustrated in the biotech context by 
Wyeth’s 75-year-old-plus secret manufacturing 
process for Premarin from mare urine5. Trade 
secrets are also enforced through the courts, 
and although it certainly is not cheap, it tends 
to be less costly than patent litigation.
Generally, patents and trade secrets are 
mutually exclusive. Because patents require 
inventors to disclose their invention to the 
public, and trade secrets demand inventors 
engage in efforts to keep them clandestine, the 
same invention cannot be protected by both a 
patent and a trade secret. Nonetheless, many 
successful companies parcel complex inven-
tions into patentable and secret elements. For 
example, a company developing liquid biopsy 
technology—an assessment of patients’ cells 
from a small sample of fluid tissue—may pro-
tect the biopsy device with patents, but the pro-
cess and software for analyzing samples, with 
trade secrets.
In addition to patents and trade secrets, 
biotech companies have also made use of 
data exclusivity—the right of a company 
to refuse to share data from clinical trials. 
Although not traditionally thought of as a 
form of IP, data exclusivity operates much 
like patents: a government-sanctioned free-
dom from competition for a fixed period of 
time. Currently, new drugs not including 
biologics receive five years of data exclusivity 
from the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), during which generic manufactur-
ers may not use those drugs’ underlying 
clinical trial data to receive FDA approval6. 
Biologics, by contrast, receive 12 years of 
exclusivity from biosimilars7. These exclu-
sivities come into force immediately upon 
FDA approval; like trade secrets, they do 
not require independent examination. But, 
because data exclusivities require a  product 
to be approved by the FDA, and because they 
are typically shorter in duration than either 
patents or trade secrets, they remain largely 
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As a result, there is little opportunity to develop 
an improved or alternative version of the prod-
uct without restarting the approval process. 
Platform technology, however—without sub-
stantial regulatory constraints—can rapidly go 
through phases of design, test, and build.
As a consequence of these differences, entre-
preneurs should be aware of the pros and cons 
of certain forms of IP protection for product 
and platform biotech startups.
Patents. A tremendous amount of value for 
product companies is often tethered to the 
products’ exclusivity. In the small-molecule 
drug context, for example, pioneer products 
can lose >80% of their value upon the entry of 
five or more competitors8. Patents, more than 
other forms of IP, tend to provide that exclusiv-
ity to products.
This exclusivity operates in two ways. First, 
with respect to small-molecule drugs, patents 
present major stumbling blocks to competi-
tors’ pathways for FDA approval. According to 
the 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act—more popularly known 
as the Hatch–Waxman Act—the FDA cannot 
approve, for at least 30 months, any generic ver-
sion of a brand manufacturer’s patented prod-
uct that has not successfully invalidated, or 
proven to not infringe on, the originator’s pat-
ents9. To that end, because patents are tethered 
to regulatory approval, small-molecule prod-
uct companies seeking to shield themselves 
from generic competition will depend almost 
entirely on the existence of patents covering the 
drug, its formulation or methods of use.
Second, patents covering a pioneering 
product provide strong disincentives to 
generic competitors from launching during 
the product’s patent term. As mentioned, the 
cost of patent litigation is itself exorbitant. 
Litigation costs aside, the harm of losing pat-
ent  infringement suits can be severe. Generic 
competitors who launch ‘at risk’ face the pros-
pect of being entirely prohibited from entering 
the market during the patent term. In addition, 
they may have to pay damages to their pioneer-
ing rivals. For example, in one patent dispute 
a secondary form of IP protection for early-
stage  biotech companies. 
Products versus platforms
Historically, biotech companies have focused 
on developing and receiving regulatory 
approval for a single product, directed to treat 
one or a narrow group of indications. The 
geneses of many now-large biotech compa-
nies serve as excellent examples. Genentech’s 
(S. San Francisco, CA, USA) first product was 
Protropin (somatrem), a recombinant growth 
hormone indicated for certain types of dwarf-
ism. Amgen (Thousand Oaks, CA, USA) got 
its start by marketing Epogen (epoetin alfa), 
recombinant erythropoietin indicated for 
anemia. And Gilead’s (Foster City, CA, USA) 
origins center on Viread (tenofovir), the anti-
retroviral used to treat HIV. These, and other 
companies like them, are product biotech 
companies—companies that seek to develop a 
specific therapeutic product to be sold directly 
to patients. Because of concentrations of exper-
tise in a particular area, product biotechs tend 
to focus their development efforts on a single 
disease or disease indication. In addition, 
these products tend to consist of treatments 
themselves rather than diagnostics. At the 
same time, product biotech companies do not 
appear to be limited to certain classes of thera-
peutics: small-molecule therapeutics, vaccines 
and complex biologics all fit within the product 
company framework in biomedicine.
Many biotech startups, however, also 
develop as platform biotechs—companies 
seeking to develop technological platforms that 
can be used for a variety of conditions. These 
can consist of laboratory diagnostics, testing 
devices, or broader therapeutic protocols or 
modalities, such as particular forms of gene 
therapy. Several notable and recently estab-
lished biotech companies appear to fit more 
firmly in this framework. Editas Medicine 
(Cambridge, MA, USA), Caribou Biosciences 
(Berkeley, CA, USA) and CRISPR Therapeutics 
(Cambridge, MA, USA), for example, are all 
focused on developing a variety of therapies 
ultimately grounded in a single gene- editing 
 technology, CRISPR. Oxford Nanopore 
(Oxford, UK) has developed an electronic 
nanopore-based DNA-sequencing technology, 
useful for gene sequencing.
The dichotomy between product and plat-
form is not absolute. Some companies appear 
to straddle the boundaries between product 
and platform biotechs. Stemcentrx (S. San 
Francisco, CA, USA), for example, has focused 
its development efforts on specific monoclonal 
antibodies used to target cancer stem cells—a 
development pathway much in the traditional 
mold of product biotech companies. But the 
company is using such trials to investigate the 
larger phenomenon of how stem cells oper-
ate across a variety of cancers in a variety of 
tumors. In that sense, Stemcentrx could be 
considered a platform biotech company as 
well. Similarly, Sequenom (San Diego) has 
developed a matrix-assisted laser desorption 
ionization time-of-flight mass spectrometry 
platform to validate gene variants from its 
sequencing tests but the company also develops 
and markets specific diagnostics for prenatal 
diseases and malignancies.
Product and platform IP strategy
Product and platform biotechs operate in 
vastly different regulatory and development 
spaces. Notably, FDA regulation operates dif-
ferently for product and platform biotechnol-
ogies. Products primarily fall under the legal 
umbrella of drugs, biologics, or devices, classes 
of therapeutics that must receive some form 
of premarket approval from the FDA before 
commercialization. Platform technologies, on 
the other hand, have traditionally been char-
acterized as laboratory-developed tests, a class 
of product that—to date—the FDA has been 
more lenient in regulating. Currently, such tests 
do not need premarket approval from the FDA.
Aside from these regulatory differences, 
development cycles between product and 
platform biotech also differ. Product compa-
nies often develop a single therapeutic—a spe-
cific monoclonal antibody, for example—that 
requires advance input from the FDA regard-
ing the structure of surrounding clinical trials. 
Table 1  Patent or trade secret?
Patent Trade secret Regulatory exclusivities
Cost to obtain $10,000–$30,000 Free Millions of dollars
Cost to maintain $3,150–$12,600 $1,000 to tens of thousands Free
Ease of obtaining Medium Easy Hard
Duration 20 years from date of filing Potentially forever 3–12 years
Likelihood of loss Medium High Low
Breadth of protection Medium to high Low to medium Low
Cost of enforceability $500,000–$10 million $100,000–$2 million Free
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Both product and platform technologies 
may also generate data themselves, such as 
sequencing data or reports from diagnostics. 
Both product and platform companies are 
free to keep such data confidential. Indeed, 
in some instances, the patient privacy regu-
lations of the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act may require them to 
do so. Developing a robust data set concern-
ing patient data, treatment and outcomes—a 
form of IP unto itself—may provide an early 
entrant important first-mover and exclusivity 
advantages over competitors. This is perhaps 
best illustrated by Myriad Genetics’ (Salt Lake 
City, UT, USA) database of genetic variants. 
Efforts to reproduce such databases, although 
possible, are nonetheless arduous, and diag-
nostic companies can leverage such data—and 
their competitors’ lack of it—in building brand 
loyalty among clinicians17.
Developing your IP portfolio
Keeping the above points in mind, consider 
below a few pieces of practical advice concern-
ing IP protection for your biotech startup.
First, think about your company in the 
future, not necessarily as it exists during the 
present. IP protection is often irretrievable. 
Information disclosed in a patent cannot be 
later protected by trade secrets; information 
kept as a trade secret for a long enough period 
of time usually cannot later mature into a pat-
ent. Plan for your company’s IP needs when it 
needs it the most—when your technology is 
on the market.
Second, think about the saleable unit of what 
you’re trying to develop—and whether it can 
be used for other indications. Is it a drug that 
appears useful to treat only a single condition? 
Is it a machine that can diagnose a variety 
of ailments? Is it a technique for developing 
personalized therapies for a specific disease? 
Tackling that question may make clear whether 
your company is in the business of a defined 
product or a broad-based platform.
Third, if your venture is more product 
focused, think about getting early patents on the 
specific product itself and, potentially, formula-
tions and methods of using it. Patents may pro-
vide some shelter from competition after you 
push your product through regulatory approval. 
If the product is difficult to manufacture—if it 
requires lesser-known technical know-how, or 
if there are differences between manufacturing 
it on clinical-trial and industrial scales—think 
about keeping that knowledge secret, as many 
successful biologics companies currently do. 
Patents on these methods won’t necessarily 
prevent generic approval, and trade secrets in 
this area are more likely to stave off economi-
cally meaningful competition.
concerning the drug Protonix (pantoprazole), 
generic manufacturer Teva (Petach Tikva, 
Israel) agreed to settle its patent dispute with 
Pfizer (New York) for $2.15 billion10.
The advantages of patent protection are 
less clear for platform biotechs. Because the 
platform technology itself, as opposed to any 
products derived from the technology, will not 
typically require FDA premarket approval, pat-
ents do not operate in the platform space as 
complements to regulatory barriers. In addi-
tion, because platform technologies tend to be 
more complex than products from a patent-
claiming perspective, competitors may find 
it easier to develop technologies that work 
around pioneer patents. For example, the pat-
ents covering Illumina’s (San Diego) MiSeqDx 
clinical gene sequencing platform did little 
to prevent ThermoFisher (Waltham, MA, 
USA) from introducing its clinical sequencer, 
the Ion Chef Instrument, or Qiagen (Hilden, 
Germany), its GeneReader. Similarly, the pat-
ent portfolio of Stemcentrx will likely do little 
to stave off potential competitors.
To be sure, many notable platform compa-
nies, including Editas and Oxford Nanopore, 
have robust patent portfolios. But this diversity 
in patent protection is likely a function of the 
specific type of underlying technology itself, 
rather than the regulatory or legal landscapes 
in which platform companies operate. It appears 
that the broader and more robust the technol-
ogy, the more patents will likely provide cover 
from competition. Fundamental technologies, 
such as CRISPR, may at least initially require 
some broad-based patents to quell competition 
because the underlying science is well-known, 
easily copied, and adaptable to a variety of 
physical embodiments. Specific applications of 
CRISPR are, even in its nascency, adaptable to 
a variety of systems. The corollary, however, is 
that the more that platform technologies are tied 
to particular machinery, the less patents serve as 
a bulwark against competitors; patents on spe-
cific machinery are often too narrow to be of 
value. The robust diversity of next-generation 
sequencing technologies seems to demonstrate 
this. Platform technologies dependent on par-
ticular physical technologies will likely have to 
compete on price, quality, and marketing—not 
the scientific elegance of the technology itself11.
Trade secrets. Compared with patents, trade 
secrets figure much less into a typical product 
biotech’s IP portfolio. Most small-molecule 
drugs can be easily manufactured once their 
chemical structure is known; there are few 
things about chemical synthesis worth keeping 
secret. Biologics, however, do present a clear 
exception to this rule in the product biotech 
space. Because of the complexity of producing 
biologics, companies often go out of their way to 
guard the specifics of their manufacturing and 
scale-up methods as trade secrets. Although the 
active moieties themselves can sometimes be 
reconstructed, current analytical methods make 
comparing a follow-on biologic to a reference 
biologic troublesome. As a consequence, bio-
similar manufacturers must develop their own 
methods of manufacture and validation, often at 
great expense. Related to this, the FDA cannot 
approve ‘biosimilars’ without rigorous assess-
ments of their manufacturing methods. Product 
biotechs developing large, complex biologics—
like monoclonal antibodies—can heavily rely on 
trade secrets to ensure exclusivity12.
For platform technologies, trade secrets are 
potentially their most powerful form of IP. 
Like biologics, platform technologies that gen-
erate therapeutics can keep, as trade secrets, 
their methods of creation, manufacture, and 
validation. Competitors may know only the 
broadest contours of their processes. And 
even where these processes are well known, 
platform companies’ employees’ tacit knowl-
edge about scaling up such technology for 
industrial operation may serve as significant 
barriers to competitors13.
Similarly, platform technologies that employ 
complex, analytical software in their products 
or services, such as those of diagnostics com-
panies, can often rely on trade secrets to shut 
out serious competition. Because analytical 
software is difficult to replicate, competitors 
seeking to replicate a pioneer company’s testing 
methods or devices may nonetheless be inca-
pable of providing comparable data analysis14. 
Where trade secrecy in analytical software 
is paired with specialized devices, platform 
technology companies can essentially create a 
black box in which few competitors can hope 
to operate. Indeed, this sort of combination 
device–software trade secrecy is precisely what 
originally drove valuations for Theranos15.
Data secrecy. Lastly, ‘data secrecy’—in the 
form of both regulatory exclusivities and trade 
secrets—can be similarly valuable to both 
product and platform biotechs. Products, or 
platforms that generate products, requiring 
FDA approval benefit greatly from being able 
to hide information obtained during clinical 
trials from competitors. As a result, where pre-
market approval is otherwise required, com-
petitors wishing to enter the same market as 
pioneer manufacturers must submit their own, 
costly clinical data. In many instances—such 
as with the requirement that biosimilars must 
demonstrate no “clinically meaningfully differ-
ences” to their reference drugs—this form of 
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Fourth, if your venture is more platform 
focused, think about keeping as much secret 
as possible. Try to convince outside users, tes-
ters, and developers of your technology to sign 
appropriate confidentiality agreements, drafted 
by a lawyer. In addition, don’t disclose too many 
of the technical details of your technology in 
investor pitches, scientific publications, or pub-
lic talks. Try to keep the inner workings of your 
platform secret. By contrast, if your platform 
focuses on a device that can be easily reverse 
engineered—like a desktop sequencer—it may 
be worth applying for patents on your tech-
nology’s basic outline. But keep in mind that 
such patents won’t be worth too much. If the 
patents are drafted too broadly, they’re likely to 
be invalidated in an infringement trial. If the 
patents are drafted too narrowly, they’ll be eas-
ily worked around by your competitors.
Finally, if your product generates data 
itself—for example, a diagnostic test product—
think ahead about mechanisms to use that 
data, either as a proprietary platform or as a 
licensed database that you can separately mon-
etize. If you are later faced with competition 
from competing services, clinicians may 
choose your product over your competitors’ 
because of your head start in data  aggregation.
Conclusion
Product and platform biotech companies, 
despite their similarities, operate in substan-
tially different spaces with respect to regulation 
and IP. Patents, trade secrets and data exclusivi-
ties each benefit product and platforms differ-
ently. Patents, for example, will continue to be 
critical to the development of product biotech-
nologies across therapeutic classes. But trade 
secrets are likely to be of critical importance 
for newly developing platform technologies. 
Relatedly, data exclusivities of various forms—
from regulatory exclusivities to data secrecy—
will continue to be advantageous forms of IP 
for both types of companies. Biotech companies 
seeking to shield themselves from competition 
should assess how their core technologies fit 
within this IP framework. 
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